III. CONGRÈS TERMINÉS


« Thomas d’Aquin et la querelle des universaux »

As is well-known, the problem of universals pervaded the entire mediaeval history of thought. The manifold answers given to the problem somehow concerned the ways one conceives reality and knowledge and the modalities of their interaction. The formulation of the problem touched upon the foundation of science and the legacy of language. In short, the problem of universals involved a reflection upon nature and on the limits and ground of a commonly shared ‘world’. The consequences of its solution for theological discourse are manifest as well. In the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries the question about universality became more and more crucial in the determination of reciprocally opposing positions, which gradually became embodied in institutions and politics. For all these reasons, intersecting the history of the querelle des universaux with the reception of Thomas Aquinas’ works and authority seemed to be a particularly fruitful field of investigation. Searching for the legacy of the labels “Thomism” and “anti-Thomism” was one of the ideas that inspired the project and furnished the framework of the colloquium.

An important line of (pseudo-)Thomistic thought, which developed after the death of Thomas Aquinas, was exclusively devoted to logical issues. Four pseudo-Thomistic treatises concerning the problem of universality were thus posited at the centre of the meeting. The discussion of these texts, of their sources and argumentative strategy, was combined with some broader reflections, moving from Thomas Aquinas himself, passing through the complex panorama of fourteenth-century theories about universals, and concluding with the school disputes of the fifteenth century.

The meeting was structured according to an alternation of conferences by Laurent CESALLI (Genève), Mario MELIADÒ (Siena-Freiburg i.Br.), Silvia NEGRI (Siena-Freiburg i.Br.), Pasquale PORRO (Bari); a public lecture by Kent EMERY JR. (Notre Dame, IN); and workshops directed by
Emanuele COCCIA (Freiburg i.Br.), Maarten J.F.M. HOENEN (Freiburg i.Br.), Ruedi IMBACH (Paris) and Catherine KÖNIG-PRALONG (Paris-Fribourg). Each of these workshops was dedicated to the presentation of a pseudo-Thomistic logical treatise. Besides the speakers, a number of scholars were invited as discussants: Marta BORGÓ (Paris), Iacopo COSTA (Paris), Fabio GIBINO (Paris), Sylvain PIRON (Paris) and Dominique POIREL (Paris) took part in the discussions of the four pseudo-epigraphs; Andrea ROBIGLIO (Leuven) proposed some reflections on the treatise De negocio logico by Franciscus Thomae. The moderators of the sessions were Adriano OLIVA, OP (Paris), “Thomas d’Aquin et les universaux”; Matthias LUTZ-BACHMANN (Frankfurt a.M.), “La querelle des universaux au XIVe siècle”; Andreas SPEER (Köln), “La querelle des universaux au XVe siècle.”

Thomas Aquinas

Thomas Aquinas’ statements on universals are scattered in many topical places of his works: Thomas never intended to write a separate treatise on universals, nor did he write, for example, a commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, as did Albert the Great. Among the loci where Thomas discusses universality directly, the treatise De ente et essentia has surely furnished Thomas’ mediaeval (and contemporary) readers, followers and detractors some important materials for discussion.

Treating Thomas’ account of universality and predicability in De ente, as well as in his Quodlibet VIII, Pasquale PORRO delivered a precious contribution about Thomas’ employment of Avicennian elements, thus taking a stand on some recent studies concerning this topic. In his talk “Indifferenza e predicabilità delle esseenze in Tommaso d’Aquino (o Tommaso d’Aquino sul numero 6),” Porro firstly outlined the Avicennian doctrine that was received by Latin authors as the theory of the ‘indifference of essences’. According to Porro, Avicenna’s account of the intention by which universality occurs is distinguished from that of the universal as such, and did not give rise to any doubts about a gnoseological or ontological interpretation of the universal. According to Porro, Avicenna was quite clear in stating, in a rather anti-Platonic way, that absolute essences pertain entirely to the mental realm. They describe the mere or absolute quidditative contents of a concept. This intention would be enacted by the intellect, moreover, through an “intentional analysis” of the concept itself, and not with the same kind of abstraction that leads to the construction of a universal as such. In both De ente and in Quodlibet VIII, as well as in his later works, Thomas pursued the same Avicennian line, according to which the ‘indifference’ of absolute essence with regards to its existence does not imply
any ontological comprehension of it. Differently from what is maintained, for example, by Giorgio Pini, Porro did not interpret the third chapter of the De ente as if Thomas were tracing there a real distinction between universality, which pertains to the essence in the intellect, and predicability, which would be a feature of the essence or nature absolutely considered, and thus referable to the individual thing independently from mental operations. Porro claimed that for Thomas the mediation of the intellect still grounds predication: it attributes to the absolute nature a ratio praedicabilitatis, according to which that nature can be predicated of a single thing. Later, in his Quodlibet VIII, where he faced the Avicennian theme of the modes of consideration of an essence, Thomas did not employ an exemplaristic system in order to confer upon the absolute essences as such an ontological foundation. Rather, he seemed only to place the possibility of essences in the divine intellect. Therefore, according to Porro, Thomas Aquinas did not substantially change his position during his career, passing from an ontological comprehension of absolute essences to a gnoseological declination of the problem. The contrary was rather affirmed by those commentators who interpreted Thomas’ earlier works as teaching that the essence is a real constituent of things in the world. According to Porro’s interpretation of Aquinas’ doctrine, the attribution of a common nature or absolute essence to an individual thing rested, in an Avicennian sense, only upon the quidditative content of the thing itself.

As it has modern scholars, Thomas’ account on universals puzzled its mediaeval readers. Porro already noticed that the Avicennian theory of the indifference of essences was received by Latin authors in various ways, and was mixed together with other constellation of themes: the threefold distinction of the universal ante rem, in re, post rem; the problem of divine ideas; theories of abstraction. In this sense, also Thomas’ reworking of the Avicennian doctrine was liable to being interpreted under external categories. As became clear during the meeting, the problem of the foundation of universality remained a crucial and critical problem in the reception of Thomas’ doctrine.

The Legacy of Thomas Aquinas: pseudo-Thomistic Treatises

Emanuele COCCIA delivered some general introductory remarks about four pseudo-Thomistic treatises on universals and on logic. In his Notes préliminaries,1 Coccia addressed the problem of studying a pseudo-epigraphic corpus of logical texts tout court, and more specifically, of studying a corpus of treatises on logic, which were soon supposed to have been written by Tho-

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1 One can find them also here: http://thom.hypotheses.org/829
mas Aquinas. The search for some works concerning logic composed by Thomas began immediately after his death (1274). Moreover, the redaction and diffusion of the four pseudo-Thomistic writings, as well as their ascription to the Doctor sanctus, must be understood in terms of the broader process of creation of a true canon of Aquinas’ works. Therefore, studying this tradition of pseudo-epigraphs would mean following an important pattern in the history of “Thomism.” Coccia provided the audience with a detailed Dossier concerning the manuscript and printed tradition of the four texts. Generally speaking, extant manuscripts date from the fifteenth century. The treatises are often transmitted in groups, and are sometimes accompanied by other pseudo-Thomistic opuscula, or, for example, by the De ente et essentia or by Giles of Rome’s Theoremata de esse et essentia. The attribution to Thomas is not always clear; in the case of the Tractatus Quoniam secundum Philosophum, the ascription to Thomas Aquinas is supported by only a very few manuscripts. The Tractatus Circa and the Tractatus Quoniam sicut dicit were already printed in the late-fifteenth century, and were included in the collection of Thomas’ Opuscula prepared by Antonius Pizzamanus.

(1) The Tractatus Circa, presented by Ruedi IMBACH, consists to a great extent of long, literal passages from extracted chapters two and three of Thomas’ De ente et essentia, juxtaposed with other reflections—intended to be ad mentem Thomae, or paraphrasing other works by Thomas—and with the recourse to Aristotle, Avicenna and Boethius. The text first proposes a quite traditional doxography of the diverse, erroneous opinions on universals by ancient philosophers, declaring in contrast the truth of Aristotle’s position. Following the Greek philosopher in the assertion that the universal is in many things, but also one beyond many, the author of the treatise distinguishes between two types of universals, the first being in the soul and possessing a ratio praedicandi, the second being in external things as a nature only potentially universal. Before treating the question about the corporeity or incorporeity of universals, the author of the Tractatus Circa definitively maintains that universality as such is only in the soul, and not in sensible beings. Noteworthily, the treatise ends with a literal quotation from De ente, chapter three, where Thomas makes clear that the ratio generis and speciei is conveyed to a nature according to that being that it possesses in the intellect.

(2) A greater autonomy with respect to Thomas’ express teaching is showed by the so-called Tractatus Quoniam sicut dicit (or Quoniam dicit Aristoteles). Catherine KÖNIG-PRALONG analysed this text in its internal structure, and compared some of its assertion with passages from previous and contemporary sources, and foremost with texts from Aquinas. The
treatise contains two definitions of the universal with their explanations, the first relying on the notion of first and second intention, the other proposing the *adagio* of the simultaneous unity and multiplicity of the universal. Further questions are dedicated to the problem whether the universal is a substance or an accident, and whether a thing subjected to universality can exist outside the soul. Two digressions are devoted to the investigation of the sciences, which alternatively regard universality as such or the thing to which universality occurs, and finally to the epistemic status of logic. Compared with other sciences, the anonymous author affirms, logic is less certain, because its proper objects, second intentions, have a mere being in the soul. Logic also is dependent on metaphysics, and argues only *probabiliter*; nevertheless, it deals with the commonest objects, and is therefore the first discipline to be learned.

(3) The treatise *Universale esse* probably represents the most complete treatment of universality written according to Thomas’ doctrine, seemingly in order to fill in a void left by the master. Gnoseological questions, concerning above all the intellectual process of abstraction, in this treatise find a considerable place; long quotations from, for example, Aristotle, pseudo-Aristotle and Albert the Great’s *De intellectu et intelligibili* are also present in the writing. Maarten J.F.M. HOENEN expounded a selection of passages from the text, and brought some other fifteenth-century documents to the attention of the audience, in order better to contextualise late-mediaeval logical discussions. Hoenen stressed one point especially. The author of the *Universale esse* repeats in many ways that the universal as a nature, as a thing outside of the soul, is *aptitudinaliter* or *potentialiter* universal, whereas in the soul it is universal *in act*. A complete *ratio universalitatis* in fact requires the intellectual abstraction of an intention from the multiplicity of individuals. Now, this doctrine was a sort of *vulgata* during the fifteenth century, as proved, for example, by the account that the Ingolstädter nominalist Johannes Parreudt at the end of the century gave of the “position of the Thomists.” According to this account, the universal is twofold, namely the complete universal, which is the result of abstraction, and the universal as it exists *fundamentally* in external things.

(4) The last pseudo-epigraph on logic discussed, the so-called *Quoniam secundum philosophum*, is the most problematic, with regard both to its ascription and to its contents. Emanuele COCCIA outlined the results of his researches upon the text and its authorship, strongly criticising the marginality of its doctrine within both academic and extra-academic intellectual contexts in fifteenth-century Europe. In 1970 Ladislaus Seńko made an edition of the treatise based on three of the nine extant manuscripts of the
work, and attributed it to a pseudo-Giles of Rome, following some sources which ascribed the text to Giles. Coccia, however, noticed that precisely in the manuscript that Šeňko used as a guide the treatise is clearly ascribed to the Dominican friar Arnaldus de Prato (cf. Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Cod. Conv. Soppr. B.3.173, ff. 75v and 86v), who was the author of some theological writings and lector in the Dominican convent of Prato. According to Coccia, this ascription must be taken seriously, although it is advanced in only one manuscript. As to its doctrine, the treatise is divided in four parts, dealing respectively with the nature of the universal, its origin, the modality of its mental being, and with the relationship of the universal to individual, subjected things. Far from being a mere reworking of Thomas’ (or Giles’) arguments, this treatise is very dependent on Albert the Great’s account of universality. As Coccia demonstrated, Arnaldus used the typical Albertinian lexicon of lux intelligentiae and influxus in the third part of the work, which he states to be the pars potior and secretior of the doctrine on universals. Moreover, Arnaldus quotes or abridges long passages from Albert’s works, for example from his Metaphysics. Given all of this evidence, the most puzzling question about the strongly Albertist-flavoured treatise remains its contemporary attribution to Giles or to Thomas Aquinas, the treatise being attributed to the latter in only one manuscript.

The Fourteenth Century: A Complex and Manifold Panorama

The complex theories of universality developed in late-thirteenth and throughout the fourteenth century in the most prominent European centres of learning was profusely depicted by Laurent CESALLI in his contribution “La querelle des universaux au 14e siècle.” Following the list of authorities on the topic presented by Johannes Sharpe in his Quaestio de universalibus, Cesalli first focused on the positions of the most well-known thinkers, namely John Buridan, William of Ockham, Peter Auriol, Giles of Rome, John Duns Scotus, Walter Burley and John Wyclif. He then examined a constellation of positions held by such “minor” authors as William Cra-thorn, Richard Brinkley, Francis of Prato, Francis of Meyronnes and Nicholas of Autrécourt. The resulting picture was far from being homogeneous. Recurring themes and elements mix in different contexts of discussion and within different conceptions of language, knowledge and reality. On the side of what traditionally has been called ‘realism’, one can find, for example, the moderate position of Giles of Rome, who affirmed a triple existence of the universal (ante rem, in re and post rem), but also stated, following Thomas Aquinas, that the universal possesses its proper unity, as well as its formal being, only in the soul, and the position of Walter Burley,
who argues that universals exist inside singular things as logical or metaphysical parts of them, which are really distinct from the whole individuals. Finally, one may include in this broad category the ‘Platonism’ of Nicolas of Autrecourt. On the other side were ‘terminist’ positions, such as that of Buridan, who conceived universality as a semantic relation; the ‘conceptualism’ of Ockham, who first defined the universal as a fictum, an artefact with objective being in the soul, and later identified the universal with the act of knowing, possessing a subjective being; the position of Peter Auriol, who described the universal as that being, esse apparens, or “intentional” being, which characterizes a thing when it is known. Some other opinions represented an intermediate position, for example the position of the Dominican Francis of Prato, who relied on Thomas Aquinas and on Hervaeus Nedellec in recognizing a universale fundamentaliter in the extra-mental and extra-linguistic realm, and a universale formale, which thus possesses unity as a mental entity. The point outlined by Cesalli is that using the traditional categories of ‘Realism’, ‘Nominalism’ and ‘Conceptualism’, which are fundamentally based on the dichotomy of recognition or negation of an extra-mental reality to universals, does not permit one to comprehend fully the variety of fourteenth-century views on the topic. In the last part of his contribution, Cesalli concluded his survey with two historical and methodological remarks, aimed at proposing a new paradigm for the study of the querelle des universaux. Firstly, he suggested that if one must search for a common denominator for all the positions he sketched, this would be not so much a question about what exists or what can be known or what something signifies, but rather, the common ground would be the necessity of answering the general question “What is sufficient for explaining the phenomenon of universality?” According to Cesalli, therefore, masters thinking about universals moved from a givenness, that is, from the fact that thinking and using language necessarily involve some kind of universality, to various metaphysical, epistemological and semantic reflections on that necessity. Accordingly, our understanding of the querelle must develop within this very perspective. In light of his second remark, Cesalli criticized the inappropriateness of the historiographical schemes that have traditionally been employed for describing the disputes on universals. Studying mediaeval discussions on the topic of universals as a manifold answer to a fact—the experience of generality in language and thinking—would lead to the recognition and description of different explaining, non-exclusive models of the subject.

The Fifteenth Century: School Awareness and Traditions of Thought

Being labelled a ‘realist’ or a ‘nominalist’ or an ‘ancient’ or a ‘modern’ or,
more precisely, a ‘Thomist’ or an ‘Albertist’ or a ‘Scotist’ or a ‘Buridanist’ was a common feature among university masters in the fifteenth century. The division of different schools of thought, which was rooted in the dispute about universals, deeply marked university thinking and philosophic literature, above all in central Europe.

The controversial but fascinating question about the meaning and employment of the banner ‘Thomist’, as well as the validity and applicability of the category of ‘Thomism’, was addressed by Kent EMERY, Jr. in his lecture “What Does it Mean to be a ‘Thomist’? Denys the Carthusian and Thomas Aquinas.” Emery traced salient moments in the intellectual biography of Denys the Carthusian (1402-1471)—from his university years in Cologne, where he was a student in the Thomist Bursa Montis, to the mature reflection at the Charterhouse of Roermond—and paused over those passages in Denys’ writings that reveal his attitude towards Aquinas’ authority. Focusing on two topics strictly related to the question of universals, which moreover represented a central topic of discussion between Albertists and Thomists at Cologne, namely the distinction between *esse* and *essentia* and the individuation of substances, Emery highlighted Denys’ critical approach to Thomas. In fact, although he had been educated in the *via Thomae*, Denys the Carthusian did not perceive himself as a Thomist *tout court*, nor did he devote himself entirely to the doctrine of the Dominican master. But it is also true that he recognized Thomas as a great master—in one of his earliest works, he called him “my patron”—making a huge employment of Thomas’ works, mainly his theological writings, during all his life, also with pedagogical intentions. As Emery stressed, Thomas was for Denys the highest authority in the Scholastic mode of theology, but not the supreme authority in theology itself. According to Denys’ theory of a threefold order of wisdom, Aquinas, the “only (Scholastic) doctor to be canonised,” was the preeminent representative for the second grade or “supernatural wisdom naturally acquired,” which nevertheless was surpassed by the mystical mode of theology and contemplation taught by Dionysius the Areopagite. In the realm of rational speculation, Denys tended furthermore to follow Albert the Great in questions of the interpretation of Aristotle, and was very receptive towards Proclean metaphysics. The example of Denys’ change of mind concerning the distinction of *esse* and *essentia* presented by Emery was particularly inspiring. In many of his works, the Carthusian numbered Thomas among the followers of the real distinction between being and essence, together with Bonaventure, Giles of Rome and William of Paris. One of the main arguments for this position was the conviction that an essence can be understood completely without
any knowledge of its esse or existence. In an interesting passage, Denys declared that he had followed Thomas in his youth, but then became convinced that Thomas’ teaching was false. Generally, Denys recognised the difficulty of the matter, but definitively denied the real distinction, mainly accepting the ‘intentional distinction’ of Henry of Ghent. Within this framework, Emery called into question the label of ‘Thomist’ often attributed to the Carthusian by interpreters. First of all, Emery wondered whether an author could be defined as a ‘Thomist’ on the basis of a core of doctrine which can be recognized as “typically Thomist”? If the answer is positive, what then would be the judgement about Denys, who evidently relied on Thomas on a number of theological questions, paraphrased his works and evoked his authority in pastoral matters, but at the same time refused some of Thomas’ fundamental metaphysical presuppositions? Moreover, as Emery finally suggested, another historical and interpretative question challenges the use of the label ‘Thomist’: are those doctrines that Denys attributed to Thomas in fact really Thomas’ teachings?

Understood in its radicality, the question on universals touches the very core of the foundation of a science. In fact, because Aristotle defined science as a knowledge of universals, determining the nature of these universals meant also making a decision about what science must be. This was surely one of the reason why the querelle des universaux was at the origin of the division into different viae in the fifteenth century. In Cologne, there were Albertist authors who addressed the question in its deeper meaning, in order to assert that their teaching represented the authentic Peripatetic tradition, and consequently that their opponents, the Thomists, could not be counted among the ranks of true realists.

As clearly shown by Mario MELIADÒ in his contribution “Scientia peripateticorum. Heymericus de Campo, the Book of Causes and the Debate on Universals in the Fifteenth Century,” the chief of the Cologne Albertists, Heymericus de Campo (1395-1460), pursued quite systematically such a programme, not only in his polemical writings, as in the Tractatus problematicus, but also in some other speculative works, as for example in his Compendium divinorum and in the Colliget principiorum. Heymericus seemed to accuse Thomas and his followers of not being able to provide science with an adequate fundamentum in re. Since Thomas characterised the true universal as post rem, that is, according to Heymericus, as a species intelligibilis or intentio in the soul which is a mere similitude with respect to the outer thing, they could not demonstrate the reality of general concepts. In this sense, Heymericus’ move was that of assimilating the Thomists account to that of the nominalists. Against these weaker positions
on universality, the Albertist set his own theory of the three states of universals. The universal ante rem represented the ray coming from the light of divine intellect; the universal in re consisted in the material individuation of this divine ray; the universal post rem was, finally, the mental reproduction of the individuated universal, which irradiates in the intellect in the act of knowing. This tri-partition expressed the idea of an essential identity, and only existential diversity, of universals, and was based on an emanationist model that had been elaborated by Albert the Great. Deeply relying on the hierarchical causal system of the pseudo-Aristotelian Liber de causis, Albert forged a metaphysics of the flowing of all forms from God, which was adopted entirely by Heymericus. Meliàò pointed out that Heymericus appealed to the propositions of the Liber de causis in every crucial passage of his exposition about threefold universality. According to Heymericus, in fact, only the type of causality expressed by the fluxus-model could support a truly realistic doctrine of universals. This model, rejected by Thomists, had its source in the Liber de causis. Therefore, Albert the Great’s inclusion of the Proclean-inspired work in the “Peripatetic canon” marked his search for a science that is founded absolutely in re. Heymericus presented himself as the restorer of the authentic ancient tradition. It is clear also that Heymericus’ battle against Thomas and Thomism revolved around the establishment of a set of masterworks and of leading doctrines, which could fit into the paradigm of ‘true philosophy’. In conclusion, Meliàò also hinted at some evidence about the curricular use of the Liber de causis on the part of Albertists, not only in Cologne but perhaps also in Paris and in Cracow, and suggested that the history of the treatise during the fifteenth century could shed yet more light on our understanding of late-mediaeval Albertism.

The necessity to act within a fierce scholarly dispute, which ostensibly concerned the correct interpretation of Aristotle but in fact involved the conception of science tout court, and therefore to react to the intellectual challenge posed by the Albertists, deeply shaped the writings of Thomists in fifteenth-century Cologne. However, the Thomist masters in Cologne, supported by Dominicans, sought also to establish Thomas’ teaching as authoritative, canonical and the ‘common doctrine’.

In her contribution “Dictur medium servare beati. The Debate on Universals in the Fifteenth Century and the Thomists of Cologne,” Silvia Negri outlined some peculiar elements of the treatment of the question on universals by those masters working at the most important Thomist college in Cologne, the Bursa Montana, showing how precisely in their answers to that question they developed a more general strategy of “mediation” and “concordism.” In their works, the Thomist masters seemed to have ab-
sorbed well that core of ideas on universals attributable to Thomas Aquinas, which were emphasized in the pseudo-Thomistic treatises on logic. Especially they emphasized that the true, complete universal is in the mind, being that concept which represents the plurality of real individuals through its similarity with them. Nevertheless, the Thomists could not resolve satisfactorily the consequent necessity of defining the very relationship of the universal with the object to which it refers, or establish to what extent the universal can be said to be “present” also in the extra-mental thing, perhaps because of Thomas’ lack of systematic treatment of that topic, and, moreover, because of Heymericus de Campo’s strong critique of Thomists’ idea of knowledge. In this sense, the masters who operated ad mentem Thomae moulded their account on universals either towards a more realistic pattern or, on the contrary, in a more rationalist way. They operated according to the kind of texts on which they were commenting (curricular texts or intended for the teaching in the Bursa), and according to the competing doctrines they had to face. In Gerardus de Monte’s commentary on De ente et essentia, as well as in the Positiones metaphysicales of Henricus de Gorrinchem (a commentary to De ente prepared for the printing at the end of the fifteenth century, which was based on the lessons of the founder of the Bursa Montana) Thomas’ doctrine about universality post rem was literally “canonised.” However, the Albertist position on the topic was strongly present in both texts, as testified by the discussion devoted to the problem of the proper meaning of universality in re. By proposing a larger signification for universal as that nature to which universality can pertain, and by according a certain reality to this nature, Thomists tried to establish a common terrain for both Albert and Thomas’ realism. In so doing, they neutralized Albert’s actual doctrine, absorbing it in Aquinas’ teaching. This very line was followed by Gerardus de Monte also in his direct response to Heymericus’ Tractatus problematicus, the so-called Tractatus ostendens, where he aimed at showing the concordance between Albert and Thomas by stating a relative identity between the principle of intellection, the universal concept and the known object. In other academic texts, such as the commentary on Peter of Spain’ Summulae prepared by Lambertus de Monte or under his guidance, the necessity of directly facing the Albertists’ doctrines was less binding. The problem of generality was confronted there in a logical context, without discussion about the metaphysical presupposition of universality in re or ante rem. The universal in the intellect was called the universale perfectum, and was said to be only in a “foundational” way in external things. Just in this way some nominalists of the late-fifteenth century described Thomas’ and his followers’ position, placing it between their own opinion and the opinion of Scotists. All in all, despite different textual
references and diverse argumentative goals, as Negri pointed out, Cologne Thomists reworked Thomas Aquinas’ doctrine on universals in the sense of highlighting its mediating and harmonizing nature. This feature was particularly clear in the works composed in the first part of the century, when the doctrinal dispute with Albertists was most lively. In fact, the Thomists aimed at supporting their master’s authority not only as superior, but also as the most commonly accepted, that is, as the doctrine that could sum up, without contradictions, the core of the true Aristotelian tradition.

Concluding Remarks

One of the aims of the colloquium, as it was formulated by Emanuele Coccia in his Notes préliminaries, was to trace a common methodology for reading and interpreting the four pseudo-Thomistic treatises that were presented. The workshops dedicated to these texts showed that the employment of a standard approach (study of implicit and explicit citations from Thomas’ works; reference to other sources; comparison with contemporary debates at the faculty of Arts; study of the strategy of argumentation) must be guided by some specific questions. Scholars must focus on the intention of the (almost always) anonymous authors as well as on those elements which could have led to the attribution to Thomas. Beyond the more or less fortuitous ascription to the holy doctor, however, the fact of this ascription is meaningful for the history of “Thomism.” In the broader perspective of the later employment of Aquinas’ works and doctrines, the meeting took advantage of analysis and reflection upon the “diversité de reception et transformation receptive” of Thomas’ authority, according to the felicitous expression of Ruedi Imbach. In this sense, some key-issues for the very specific reading of the querelle des universaux pursued in the colloquium turned out to be these: What actually comes from Thomas Aquinas? What was transmitted under his name? What can be traced back to his writings? What was proposed as Thomas’ doctrine? What can be maintained according to or against his authority? How did specific doctrines and spurious texts come to be canonised?

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